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NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT
Graham Leonard PhD, 25-5-06
A new Iraqi government has finally been agreed upon
to give form to the 15 December 2005 election, two days before the
deadline set in last Fall’s constitution. This long delay indicates how
contested have been these protracted negotiations between religious and
ethnic communities—“Millets.” But even after five months, a complete
cabinet could not be agreed upon. The three crucial ministries were not
filled. Instead, Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki finessed the 22 May
deadline.
The Prime Minister, a Shi’a, assumed, temporarily,
the Ministry of Interior—Police. He named his Sunni Deputy Prime
Minister, Salam Zubaie, temporary Minister of defense—Army. A Kurdish
Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Barhum Saleh, became temporary Minister of
National Security—Intelligence. These additional assignments are
temporary to give more time for the Millets to try to agree without
breaking the legal deadline. So technically the deadline was
temporarily met, but actually no agreement was met. These Millets are
not individual politicians or even political parties but communities
with centuries of violent interactions, each with its own armed militia
(Shi’as two) today.
Thirty-six of the thirty-nine cabinet posts were
agreed upon. Seventeen posts went to Shi’as, seven to Kurds, seven to
Sunnis and five to the Secular Alliance of former Prime Minister
Allawi, mostly nominal Shi’as. A Kurd, Hoshyar Zebari, was named
Foreign Minister. Shi’a Bayan Jabar became Finance Minister. How will
these ministers manage their ministries when most never leave the
safety of the Coalition’s Green Zone?
Most ominously, two prominent Sunni members of
parliament, Saleh al Mutlaq and Abdul Nasir al Janabi walked out,
taking thirteen others of the forty Sunni members with him. Without
more Sunni support the new government is not a “Unity.” The hope had
been that support by the Sunni Establishment, represented in the
parliament, would make it possible to bank down the violence of the
fanatical minority within the Sunni community. Now, it seems certain
that the Sunni Insurgency against the Occupation Coalition and the
Sunni Revolution against the Iraqi government will continue despite the
claims of the U.S. Administration over the past week-end.
The only positive note to the cabinet announcement
was that one Sunni member of parliament, Mithal al Alousi, tried to
stop the fifteen Sunnis from leaving. He cried out to those departing:
“Enough Iraqis have died. Let us try to work within the system.” There
has been strong resentment by Iraqis from all Millets against the
pressures put by U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for the inclusion of
Sunnis in a government of unity. They say that they know how crucial
that is without being taught by the Americans.
The new Iraqi government does not represent
individual voters from areas but a group of Millets contesting with
each other. The December elections reflected exactly the percentages of
the voters in each Millet. They struggle desperately because whoever
takes control of Iraq now will retain power until removed by force. The
concept of a loyal opposition does not exist in Iraq. Any opposition is
considered an enemy to be eliminated
by phony jobs, bribes, exile, imprisonment or killing. In the Middle
East, armies are to control the citizens of the country more than for
fighting foreign enemies.
Each Millet in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley came into the area after the
1258 AD Mongol massacres of seven millions, mostly Muslims. The Sunnis
and a third of the Shi’as came from the Syrian and Arabian deserts’
nomadic tribes. Two-thirds of the Shi’as came from Persia (Iran) and
the Gulf. The surviving mountain Kurds were replenished by other Kurds
from surrounding areas. Turkomen Shi’as came from central Asia. Under
the occupation of the Ottoman Empire (c. 1520-1917), each Millet had
its own personal status laws and courts, further defining their
differences. After 1850, a small percentage of boys from each Millet
attended Western schooling, giving access to Middle Class wealth and
power at widely different periods. To divide the Millets further, the
Kurds and Turkomen now have schools in their own languages, a certain
divider for the future of a nation.
Historically, the Sunni Arab minority has ruled the Iraqi area for over
five centuries. They feel entitled to continue to dominate Iraq, and at
the same time fear Shi’a and Kurdish revenge for the years of their
domination, if not persecution. The Sunni eighty five percent of
Muslims outside Iraq strongly believe that Iraq can not be ruled by
anyone but Sunnis. Iraqi Shi’as have the complexes of a majority ruled
over by a minority and the desires to take power and the vengeance that
may be expected,
Fate has provided oil only in the Kurdish and Shi’a
areas. The Sunnis, sitting astride the oil pipelines have only the
power of spoilers. The Coalition Invasion not only removed the tyrant
Saddam, it raised the hopes of every Millet, except the Sunnis, that
their Millet would control Iraq, be favored over one or more other
Millets or at least be better off than before. Rigid factions with such
histories as Iraqi Millets find it difficult to give and take as needed
in any non fascist political system, especially democracy.
The 2005 Iraqi Constitution states that the
President, Prime Minister and changes to the Constitution need a
two-thirds majority. Al Sistani’s Shi’as hold a clear thirty-five
percent. No Millet or combination can rule Iraq that does not include
the al Sistani faction! That is why al Sadr did the arithmetic
abandoned Chalaby and joined al Sistani’s Shi’a Alliance last November.
But al Sadr is not satisfied with his share of the spoils.
The Shi’as, if they remain united, control enough
votes to rule Iraq as a majority without any partners. The Kurds, with
Iranian and Turkish mortal enemies on their borders, desperately want
to be part of the Iraqi government. With or without al Sadr’s Shi’as,
the Kurds could be allied with al Sistani’s Shi’as to rule Iraq. Sunnis
are essential if the Insurrection and Revolution are to be stopped, or
at least lessened to the point that Iraqi army and police could contain
them. The Sunni Establishment share some of the Insurgents’ and
Revolutionaries’ fears of the Shi’as and Kurds, but they are caught in
the middle. For the present, they seem to be more willing to risk the
wrath of the Kurds and Shi’a than of the extremists in their own Millet.
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